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We use Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation to analyse Nash-Williams’ elegant but non-constructive
‘minimal bad sequence’ proof of Higman’s Lemma. The result is a concise constructive proof of
the lemma (for arbitrary decidable well-quasi-orders) in which Nash-Williams’ combinatorial idea is
clearly present, along with an explicit program for finding an embedded pair in sequences of words.
1 Introduction
We call a preorder (X ,≤X) a well-quasi-order (WQO) if any infinite sequence (xi) has the property
that xi ≤X x j for some i < j. The theory of WQOs contains several results which state that certain
constructions on WQOs inherit well-quasi-orderedness, the most famous being Kruskal’s tree theorem
[11]. A special case of this theorem is Higman’s lemma:
Theorem 1 (Higman, [9]). If (X ,≤X) is a WQO, then so is the set (X∗,≤X∗) of words in X under the
embeddability relation ≤X∗ , where 〈x0, . . . ,xm−1〉 ≤X∗ 〈x′0, . . . ,x′n−1〉 iff there is a strictly increasing map
f : [m]→ [n] with xi ≤X x′f i for all i < m.
A short proof of Higman’s lemma (and more generally Kruskal’s theorem) was given by Nash-
Williams [13], using an elegant but non-constructive combinatorial idea known as the minimal bad se-
quence argument.
Higman’s lemma has attracted a great deal of attention in logic and computer science, and has been a
focal point of research into computational aspects of classical reasoning used in infinitary combinatorics.
The constructive content of Nash-Williams’ minimal bad sequence argument has been widely analysed
(see for instance [5, 19]), and in particular, constructive content has been extracted from the proof using
formal methods such the A-translation [12] and inductive definitions [6]. An extensive study of program
extraction for Higman’s lemma has been carried out by Berger and Seisenberger (see [3, 17]), who
improve the aforementioned techniques and implement them in the MINLOG system.
In this article we give another constructive proof of Higman’s lemma based on the minimal bad
sequence argument. The novelty of our approach is that we use a technique that has not been applied
in this context - Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation. The combination of the negative translation and the
Dialectica interpretation forms an extremely powerful and efficient method for extracting programs from
classical proofs - testament to this is its central role in the well-known proof mining program (see [10]).
The formal extraction of computational information from proofs often results in output that is com-
plex, highly syntactic and difficult to understand in mathematical terms. However, the use of proof
theoretic techniques to analyse the constructive content of classical reasoning is becoming increasingly
relevant in mathematics, therefore we believe that it is important to produce case studies in which these
techniques are applied in a transparent and intuitive manner.
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The goal of this article is not just a new proof of Higman’s lemma, but a case study that sheds
some light on the functional interpretation of proofs in infinitary combinatorics. Our emphasis here
is not on ‘mining’ the proof for quantitative information but to produce a constructive justification of
Higman’s lemma that can actually be read as a mathematical proof, and in which Nash-Williams’ original
combinatorial idea is clearly present. In addition, we give a heuristic account of the operational behaviour
of the resulting program.
1.1 Preliminaries
We formalise Higman’s lemma in the language PAω of Peano arithmetic in all finite types (see e.g. [1]
for details), although throughout the paper we endeavour to avoid excessive formality and make various
syntactic shortcuts to keep things as readable as possible. By extending PAω with the axiom of dependent
choice
DC : ∀n,xX∃yX An(x,y)→∀x0∃ fN→X( f (0) = x0∧∀n An( f n, f (n+1)))
over arbitrary types X , one obtains a theory of analysis capable of formalising a large portion of mathe-
matics, including Nash-Williams’ minimal bad sequence construction.
Notation. We make use of the following conventions and abbreviations.
• 0X denotes a canonical element of type X .
• Because we will be confronted with a large number of variables, we often use the convention that
when a term of type X is denoted x, sequences of terms of the same type will often be denoted in
bold type x.
• s∗α represents the concatenation of the finite sequence s and a finite/infinite sequence α .
• We write s≺ α when the finite sequence s is an initial segment of a finite/infinite sequence α .
• [α ](n) is the initial segment of the infinite sequence α of size n.
• We write aEb when a word a : X∗ is an initial segment of b i.e. |a| ≤ |b| and ai = bi for all i < |a|.
If a is a prefix (|a|< |b|) we write a⊳b.
• Given two sequences of words u and v we write uEn v :≡ ([u](n) = [v](n)∧unE vn) and u⊳n v :≡
([u](n) = [v](n)∧un⊳ vn) - the latter simply states that u is lexicographically less than v at point n
with respect to the prefix relation ⊳.
1.2 The functional interpretation of proofs in PAω +DC
This article assumes familiarity with Go¨del’s functional interpretation of classical proofs, by which we
mean the Dialectica interpretation combined with the negative translation. We do not have space to give
details of the interpretation - for this the reader is referred to [1]. However, it is useful to recall a few
basic facts.
• The functional interpretation of Σ2 formulas coincides with the well-known no-counterexample in-
terpretation of Kreisel, interpreting A≡∃x∀yA0(x,y) as a functional F that witnesses ∀ f∃xA(x, f x).
Intuitively F justifies A by refuting arbitrary counterexample functions f attempting to disprove A.
• The functional interpretation interprets Π2 formulas ∀x∃yB(x,y) directly with a functional f satis-
fying ∀xB(x, f x), due to the fact that it admits Markov’s principle. This means that we can use the
interpretation to extract programs from even classical proofs of Π2 theorems.
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It was shown by Go¨del that PAω has a functional interpretation in the system T of higher-type
primitive recursive functionals. On the other hand, system T is insufficient to interpret the combination
of classical logic and countable choice. For this, one typically assigns a direct realizer to the negative
translation of choice, usually some form of backward induction such as the well-known bar recursion
devised by Spector in [18]. In this article dependent choice is interpreted using the more recent product
of selection functions introduced in [7].
Definition 2. A selection function is any functional of type JRX :≡ (X → R)→ X, for arbitrary X, R.
Given an indexed family of selection functions ε : X∗ → JRX together with functionals q : Xω → R and
ϕ : Xω → N, the product of selection functions EPS is defined by the recursion schema
EPSϕs (ε)(q)
Xω
:=
{
0Xω if ϕ(ŝ)< |s|
as ∗EPS
ϕ
s∗as(ε)(qas) otherwise
where as = εs(λx . qx(EPSϕs∗x(ε)(qx))), qx is defined by qx(α) := q(x∗α) and sˆ is the canonical extension
of s.
EPS is a variant of bar recursion that makes explicit the idea that bar recursion can be viewed as kind
of backtracking algorithm analogous to the computation of optimal strategies in games of unbounded
length. We feel it is good practise to choose it over Spector’s original bar recursion because it comes nat-
urally equipped with this game semantics. The idea is to imagine q : Xω → R specifying the outcome of
a sequential game with moves of type X and outcome of type R, the εs as selection functions that specify
a strategy for round |s| given that s has already been played and ϕ : Xω → N as a control functional that
indicates when the game has terminated. For further details on the EPS see [8]. By unwinding Definition
2 one can prove the following key result.
Theorem 3 (Main theorem on EPS, cf. [16]). Setting α :=EPSϕ〈〉(ε)(q) and ps := λx . qs∗x(EPS
ϕ
s∗x(ε)(qs∗x))
solves the following system of equations
αn
X
= ε[α ](n)(p[α ](n))
q(α) R= p[α ](n)(αn)
(1)
for all n≤ ϕα .
As originally established by Spector, in order to witness the functional interpretation of dependent
choice it is sufficient to solve the equations (1) given ε , q and ϕ . Therefore a consequence of Theorem 3
is that EPS realizes the functional interpretation of dependent choice. For full details of the interpretation
of choice via EPS the reader is referred to [16]. In this article however, it is enough to know that EPS
solves (1) - in our interpretation of the minimal bad sequence construction an instance of these equations
naturally arises and we will solve them directly using EPS, bypassing the formal interpretation of choice.
The statement that X∗ is a WQO can be written as a Π2 sentence. By formalising the classical
proof of Higman’s lemma in PAω +DC, we guarantee in theory that given a realizer for the well-quasi-
orderedness of X we can extract a direct realizer Γ : (X∗)ω →N in T+EPS that bounds the search for an
embedded pair in an arbitrary sequence of words. We formalise the proof in Sect. 3 and extract a realizer
Γ in Sect. 4.
2 A Classical Proof of Higman’s Lemma
We begin by presenting Nash-Williams’ proof of Higman’s lemma. First we need the following simple
result.
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Lemma 4. In a WQO (X ,≤X), any sequence (xi) has an infinite increasing subsequence.
Proof. For general WQOs this is an easy consequence of Ramsey’s theorem.
In the following we call a sequence in a preorder X good if xi ≤X x j for some i < j. A sequence is
bad if it is not good. X is a WQO if all sequences in X are good.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Nash-Williams, [13]). Suppose for contradiction that X is a WQO, but there exists
at least one bad sequence u in (X∗)ω . Then among all bad sequences we pick a minimal bad sequence as
follows:
1. Choose v0 to be an element of X∗ with the property that v0 is the first element of some bad sequence
but no prefix of v0 extends to a bad sequence in this way. Such an element exists by the assumption
that we have at least one bad sequence u.
2. Given that v0, . . . ,vn−1 have been selected, choose vn to be an element with the property that
v0, . . . ,vn starts a bad sequence but v0, . . . ,vn−1,y does not extend to a bad sequence for any prefix
y⊳ vn.
By dependent choice we can construct an infinite sequence (vi) in this manner. It is easy to see that (vi)
must itself be bad and therefore in particular each word vi must be non-empty, so we can write vi = v˜i ∗xi
where the xi form an infinite sequence in X .
Now by Lemma 4 the sequence (xi) has an increasing subsequence
xi0 ≤X xi1 ≤X . . . .
Consider the sequence
v0, . . . ,vi0−1, v˜i0 , v˜i1 , . . . .
This sequence must be bad, else (vi) would be good, but v˜i0 is a proper initial segment of vi0 , contradicting
the minimality of (vi) at i0. Therefore there cannot exist an initial bad sequence u in X∗.
3 Formalising the Classical Proof
We now formalise Nash-Williams’ proof in PAω +DC, so that we are ready to apply the functional
interpretation in the next section. Given a preorder (X ,≤X) define the predicate θX on Xω ×N by
θX (x, j) :≡ ∀i0 < i1 ≤ j(xi0 X xi1).
We define the predicate θX∗ on (X∗)ω ×N similarly. We suppress the subscript on θ when it is clear
which type it applies to.
Remark 5. In this article the intuition is that the underlying WQO X consists of elements of type 0, and
that the relation ≤X is decidable. Therefore E, ≺, En and θ will all be decidable over both X and X∗.
A sequence x is bad is it satisfies the Π1 predicate ∀ jθ(x, j). The preorder X is a WQO if the closed
Π2 predicate WQO[X ] :≡ ∀x∃ j¬θX(x, j) holds, similarly X∗ is a WQO if WQO[X∗] :≡ ∀u∃ j¬θX∗(u, j)
holds. Higman’s lemma can then be formally written as
WQO[X ]→WQO[X∗].
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In the proof of Higman’s lemma, the hypothesis WQO[X ] appears in the form given by Lemma 4, namely
that any sequence in X has an infinite monotone subsequence:
MonSeq[X ] :≡ ∀xX
ω
∃gN→N∀k∀i < j ≤ k(gi < g j∧ xgi ≤X xg j). (2)
In our interpretation of Nash-Williams’ proof we do not analyse the computational content of Lemma 4,
rather we directly interpret
MonSeq[X ]→WQO[X∗].
There are two reasons for this - the first is that in general the passage from WQO[X ] to MonSeq[X ]
requires Ramsey’s theorem and therefore full dependent choice, so while one could in theory interpret
Lemma 4 using bar recursion or the product of selection functions, in this article we wish to focus on the
main content of Nash-William’s proof, so we omit these details.
The second reason is that in certain interesting cases it is easy to prove MonSeq[X ] directly, without
resorting to Ramsey’s theorem. For instance, when the underlying alphabet X is a finite set, MonSeq[X ] is
provable in PAω using the infinite pigeonhole principle, and so a realizer for the functional interpretation
of MonSeq[X ] can be given in system T.
3.1 The Minimal Bad Sequence Argument
Our main step in the formalisation of Nash-Williams’ proof is the formalisation of his minimal bad
sequence argument. The main non-trivial principle of PAω we require is the least element principle -
LEP : ∃mA(m)→∃m′(A(m′)∧¬A(m′−1)),
where in our version we assume that A is monotone in the sense that it satisfies (i) i < j→ (A(i)→ A( j))
and (ii) ¬A(0).
Lemma 6 (Minimal bad sequence construction). It it provable in PAω +DC that for any sequence of
words u : (X∗)ω , there exists a sequence pu ≡ p0,p1, . . . of sequences of type (X∗)ω and a sequence
fu ≡ f0, f1, . . . of functions of type (X∗)ω → N, which, defining p−1 := u, together satisfy the following
sentences:
∀n([pn−1](n) = [pn](n)); (3)
∀n, j(¬θ(pn, j)→¬θ(pn−1, j)); (4)
∀n,q(X
∗)ω (q⊳n pn →¬θ(q, fnq)). (5)
This formulation of the minimal bad sequence construction is a little more intricate than that given in
Sect. 2, in particular our aim is to highlight the computational aspects of the construction. The intuition
is that the sequence pu is classically constructed in the following manner:
1. Given an initial sequence u, we choose p0 to be a bad sequence such that p00E u0 but no y⊳ p00
extends to a bad sequence. If no prefix of u0 extends to a bad sequence we set p0 := u.
2. Given that we have constructed pn−1, we choose pn to be a bad extension of [pn−1](n) such that
[pn](n) ∗ y does not extend to a bad sequence for any y⊳pnn. If no such bad extension exists, we
set pn := pn−1.
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If pu is defined in this way then it clearly satisfies (3), and for each pn we can produce a (classically
constructed) function fn that witnesses the minimality of pn in the sense of (5).
We observe that the pn are not necessarily bad (in fact if X is a WQO they never will be), but the
point is that pn only fails to be bad in the event that pn−1 is good, in which case we must have pn = pn−1.
This is the intuition behind (4). Nash-Williams’ proof is based on the fact that if X is a WQO then by (5)
we can show that there is some n and j such that θ(pn, j) fails, and then by induction over (4) we must
have ¬θ(u, j).
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose for the moment that n and w(X∗)ω are fixed. Define the monotone predicate
A(m) :≡ ∃r(X∗)ω∀i|Am|ri where
|Am|ri :≡ rEn w∧ |rn|< m∧ (θ(w, i)→ θ(r, i)).
It is clear that A(m) is monotone, and that ∀i|A|wn|+1|wi holds. Therefore by LEP there exists some m′
such that {
∃p∀ j(pEn w∧ |pn|< m′∧ (θ(w, j)→ θ(p, j)))∧
∀q∃k
(
qEn w∧ |qn|< m′−1→ (θ(w,k)∧¬θ(q,k))
) . (6)
Now, observing that if pEn w∧|pn|< m′ then q⊳n p→ qEn w∧|qn|< m′−1 we can prove in PAω that
(6) implies
∃p(∀ j ([w](n) = [p](n)∧ (θ(w, j)→ θ(p, j)))∧∀q∃k (q⊳n p→¬θ(q,k))) . (7)
Skolemizing (7) we have that for arbitrary n, w, there exists a sequence p and function f : (X∗)ω → N
satisfying
∀ j,q([w](n) = [p](n)∧ (θ(w, j)→ θ(p, j))∧ (q⊳n p→¬θ(q, f q))) . (8)
By DC of type (X∗)ω ×((X∗)ω →N) applied to (8) (only dependent on the sequence part of the previous
entry), defining an initial value p−1 := u there exists an infinite sequence of sequences pu ≡ p0,p1 . . . and
functions fu ≡ f0, f1 . . . satisfying
∀n, j,q([pn−1](n) = [pn](n)∧ (θ(pn−1, j)→ θ(pn, j))∧ (q⊳n pn →¬θ(q, fnq))). (9)
This completes the proof, as (3), (4) and (5) clearly follow from (9).
In the following MB[X∗] abbreviates the statement that for all u there exists pu and fu satisfying (9).
3.2 Completing the Proof
Notation. Given a non-empty word x : X∗ we write x = x˜ ∗ x¯ where x˜ : X∗ and x¯ : X . So that these are
well defined for all x, we define 〈˜〉 := 〈〉 and ¯〈〉 = 0X . Given a sequence of p : ((X∗)ω)ω we define the
diagonal sequences p˜ : (X∗)ω by p˜i := p˜ii and p¯ : Xω by p¯i := ¯pii.
Theorem 7. It is provable in PAω that MonSeq[X ]∧MB[X∗]→WQO[X∗].
Proof. Take an arbitrary sequence u : (X∗)ω . By MB[X∗] there exists pu and fu satisfying (3-5). We
show that one of the pi must be good, which by (4) implies that u must also be good.
By MonSeq[X ] applied to p¯ there exists a monotone function g such that p¯gi ≤X p¯g j for all i < j.
Define
ψ
(X∗)ω
:= [pg0−1](g0)∗ (p˜gi)i∈N ≡ pg0−10 , . . . ,p
g0−1
g0−1, p˜g0, p˜g1, . . .
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LEP DC
Lem. 6
MB[X∗]
Thm. 7
MonSeq[X ]∧MB[X∗]→WQO[X∗]
MonSeq[X ]→WQO[X∗]
Figure 1: Structure of Nash-Williams’ proof.
Now either pg0g0 is empty (and hence pg0 is trivially good) or p˜g0⊳pg0g0 and thus ψ⊳g0 pg0, which by (5)
implies that ¬θ(ψ , fg0ψ) i.e. the sequence
[ψ ](fg0ψ +1)≡ pg0−1g0 , . . . ,p
g0−1
g0−1, p˜g0, p˜g1, . . . , p˜g(fg0ψ−g0)
has one word contained in a later one. But by construction of g this implies that the sequence
pg0−10 , . . . ,p
g0−1
g0−1,p
g0
g0,p
g0+1
g0−1, . . . ,p
g(fg0ψ−g0)
g(fg0ψ−g0),p
g(fg0ψ−g0)+1
g(fg0ψ−g0)+1 (∗)
has one element contained in a later one (note that x˜≤X∗ y˜→ x≤X∗ y unless |x|= 1 and |y|= 0, which is
why we need to add the extra element at the end of (∗)). But by the nesting property (∗) is just an initial
segment of pg(fg0ψ−g0)+1, which must therefore be good. This completes the proof.
Combining Theorem 7 with Lemma 6 we see that MonSeq[X∗]→WQO[X∗] can be formalised in
PAω +DC. The proof as a whole is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3.3 Computational Aspects of Nash-Williams’ Proof
Now that we have formalised Nash-Williams’, we pause for a moment before the full program extraction
to look at the computational hints contained in the classical proof. Assuming a realizer g for MonSeq[X ],
given an arbitrary sequence of words u : (X∗)ω suppose we construct pu, fu as in Lemma 6 and the
sequence ψ as in the proof of Theorem 7.
By inspecting the proof of Theorem 7, it is not too difficult to show that there exists i0 < i1 ≤ φ(u)
such that ui0 ≤X∗ ui1 , where
φ(u) := g(fg0u ψ)+1.
To see this, note that we prove that ¬θ(pg(fg0ψ−g0)+1,g(fg0ψ − g0)+ 1) and so therefore we also have
¬θ(u,g(fg0ψ −g0)+1) by (4) and hence ¬θ(u,φ(u)) since g is monotone.
Now φ(u) is clearly an ineffective bound for Higman’s lemma, as it depends on non-constructive
objects g, pu and fu. However, in order to verify the correctness of φ(u), we do not need the whole of
these objects. Rather
• g must satisfy (2) up to k = fg0ψ ,
• pu, fu must satisfy (3-5) up to n = φ(u).
Therefore, if we have a procedure that will compute approximations to these objects up to a finite
point parametrised by those objects themselves, we can turn φ into an effective bound for Higman’s
lemma. This is precisely what the functional interpretation does.
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4 A Constructive Proof of Higman’s Lemma
We now build our constructive version of Nash-Williams’ proof. This section follows closely the struc-
ture of Sect. 3. Recall that we assume a realizer for the functional interpretation of MonSeq[X ], namely
a functional G : Xω → ((NN→ N)→ (N→ N)) satisfying (cf. (2))
∀xX
ω
,ϕNN→N∀i < j ≤ ϕ(Gxϕ)(Gxϕ < Gxϕ j∧ xGxϕ i ≤X xGxϕ j). (10)
In general, such a realizer could be obtained from a realizer of WQO[X ] by implementing a computa-
tional interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem - such as the one given in [15] using the product of selection
functions. However, when X is finite, G can be given directly using the standard interpretation of the
infinite pigeonhole principle found in e.g. [14].
4.1 Interpreting the Minimal Bad Sequence Argument
The central part of our constructive proof is the following, constructive version of Lemma 6, which is
just a realizer for the functional interpretation of MB[X∗].
Notation. Recall (Sect. 1.2) that we denote the type of a selection function by JRX :≡ (X → R)→ X .
We use the abbreviation Y ≡ (X∗)ω × ((X∗)ω → N) for the type of our choice sequence. Also, in what
follows it will be useful to implicitly write variables F : A → B×C as pairs 〈FA→B0 ,FA→C1 〉 - this slight
abuse of types will make our syntax much more intuitive.
Lemma 8 (Minimal bad sequence construction). For fixed n and w(X∗)ω define the decidable formula
|An,wm |ri by
|An,wm |ri := rEn w∧ |rn|< m∧θ(r, i),
which is slightly simpler than that used in the proof of Lemma 61. Define the functionals
εn,w = 〈ε
0
n,w,ε
1
n,w〉 : JN×(X∗)ωY
by
〈ε0n,w〈JY→N,QY→(X
∗)ω 〉,ε1n,w〈J,Q〉〉
Y
:= 〈pi, fi〉 (11)
where i≤ |wn| is the greatest integer satisfying ¬|An,wi |Q(pi, fi)fi(Q(pi, fi)) and the finite sequences p0, . . . , p|wn| andf0, . . . , f|wn| are defined recursively by
f0 := 0(X∗)ω→N
fi := λq.J(q, fi−1)
p|wn | := w
pi−1 := Q(pi, fi).
(12)
Now, given an arbitrary sequence u : (X∗)ω , define the family of selection functions ε˜u : Y ∗→ JN×(X∗)ωY
by
ε˜u〈P,F〉〈J,Q〉 := ε|〈P,F〉|,P|〈P,F〉|−1〈J,Q〉, (13)
1It would have been sufficient, although less direct, to obtain (7) in the proof of Lemma 6 by applying LEP to this simpler
formula. We opt for this variant now to simplify the subsequent constructions, as either version would result in essentially the
same program.
Thomas Powell 57
where we define the initial value P−1 := u. Now, given counterexample functionals Ω,Φ : Y ω → N and
Ψ : Y ω → (X∗)N, the sequences
pu, fu
Y ω
:= EPSΩ〈〉(ε˜
u)(〈Φ,Ψ〉)
satisfy, defining p−1u := u, the following sentences (cf. (3-5)):
∀n≤ Ωp,f([pn−1](n) = [pn](n)); (14)
∀n≤ Ωp,f(¬θ(pn,Φp,f)→¬θ(pn−1,Φp,f)); (15)
∀n≤ Ωp,f(Ψp,f⊳n pn →¬θ(Ψp,f, fn(Ψp,f))). (16)
These sequences pu, fu computed via the product of selection functions interpret the instance of DC
used in the minimal bad sequence construction, and witness the no-counterexample interpretation of
MB[X∗]. The functional Ω determines how large the approximation to the choice sequence is, and Φ, Ψ
in some sense calibrate its depth.
Our aim in the next section is to pick suitable counterexample functions such that (16) implies
¬θ(pn,Φp,f) for some n ≤ Ωp,f, then by induction over (15) we have
¬θ(pn,Φp,f)→¬θ(p−1,Φp,f))≡ ¬θ(u,Φp,f),
and we therefore obtain ∃i0 < i1 ≤ Φpu,fu(ui0 ≤X∗ ui1) i.e. a constructive bound for u being good. First
we must prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 8. First, we show that εn,w witnesses the functional (i.e. no-counterexample) interpre-
tation of (8), in the sense that given counterexample functions J,Q : Y → N× (X∗)ω for j,q we have
(suppressing dependencies and writing εb Y= εbn,w(〈J,Q〉))
[w](n) = [ε0](n)∧ (θ(w,Jε)→ θ(ε0,Jε))∧ (Qε⊳n ε0 →¬θ(Qε ,ε1(Qε))). (17)
The following is a constructive version of the proof of Lemma 6. Let 0≤ i≤ |wn| be the greatest number
such that ¬|An,wi |
Q(pi, fi)
fi(Q(pi, fi)), so by definition we have 〈ε
0,ε1〉= 〈pi, fi〉. There are two cases.
Case 1: i = |wn|. Then we have
¬|A|wn||
Qε
ε1(Qε)) ≡ QεEn w∧ |(Qε)n|< |wn| → ¬θ(Qε ,ε1(Qε)).
Therefore, observing that ε0 = p|wn| := w and (Qε)⊳n ε0 → (Qε)En w∧|(Qε)n|< |wn|, we easily obtain
(17).
Case 2: i < |wn|. By maximality of i, |Ai+1|Q(pi+1, fi+1)fi+1(Q(pi+1, fi+1)) must be true. Now looking at the defining
equations (12), we have Q(pi+1, fi+1) = pi = ε0 and fi+1(Q(pi+1, fi+1)) = fi+1(pi) = J(pi, fi) = Jε ,
therefore the following two formulas are true:
|Ai+1|ε
0
Jε ≡ ε
0
En w∧ |(ε
0)n| ≤ i∧θ(ε0,Jε); (18)
¬|Ai|Qεε1(Qε) ≡ QεEn w∧ |(Qε)n|< i→¬θ(Qε ,ε1(Qε)). (19)
Now by (18) we have [w](n) = [ε0](n)∧ (θ(w,Jε) → θ(ε0,Jε)), and because Qε ⊳n ε0 → Qε En w∧
|(Qε)n|< i by (19) we obtain Qε⊳n ε0 →¬θ(Qε ,ε1(Qε)). Therefore (17) holds.
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Thus we have shown that εn,w witnesses (17) for arbitrary n,w,J and Q. Now setting
pu, fu
Y ω
:= EPSΩ〈〉(ε˜
u)(〈Φ,Ψ〉)
Jn(p, f ) N:= Φ〈[pu](n),[fu](n)〉∗〈p, f 〉(EPSΩ〈[pu](n),[fu](n)〉∗〈p, f 〉(ε˜u)(〈Φ,Ψ〉))
Qn(p, f )
(X∗)ω
:= Ψ〈[pu](n),[fu](n)〉∗〈p, f 〉(EPS
Ω
〈[pu](n),[fu](n)〉∗〈p, f 〉(ε˜
u)(〈Φ,Ψ〉))
(20)
by the main theorem on EPS quoted in Sect. 1.2 we satisfy Spector’s equations
pn, fn = ε0
n,pn−1(Jn,Qn),ε1n,pn−1(Jn,Qn)
Jn(pn, fn),Qn(pn, fn) = Φp,f,Ψp,f
(21)
for all n ≤ Ωp,f. By setting w := pn−1, J := Jn and Q := Qn in (17) and substituting in (21), we obtain
equations (14-16).
4.2 Constructing a Realizer for Higman’s Lemma
Definition 9. Given a pair of sequences p : ((X∗)ω)ω and f : ((X∗)ω → N)ω , let Gp,f be a realizer for
MonSeq[X ] on the sequence (p¯i) and counterexample function
ϕp,f := λg . fg0([pg0−1](g0)∗ (p˜gi)).
Define the functionals Ω, Φ and Ψ by (suppressing the subscript on G, ϕ)
Ω(p, f) := G(ϕG)+1,
Φ(p, f) := G(ϕG)+1,
Ψ(p, f) := [pG0−1](G0)∗ (p˜Gi).
Finally, define Γ : (X∗)ω → N by
Γ(u) := Φ(pu, fu),
where pu, fu := EPSΩ〈〉(ε˜u)(〈Φ,Ψ〉) with ε˜u defined as in Lemma 8.
The main theorem of this article is the following, constructive analogue of Theorem 7.
Theorem 10 (Higman’s lemma, constructive version). Suppose X is a WQO. Then for all sequences of
words u : X∗ over X we have
∃i0 < i1 ≤ Γ(u)(ui0 ≤X∗ ui1)
where Γ is constructed as in Definition 9.
Proof. Fix u. In what follows, p, f are fixed as pu, fu. We use the abbreviation Ωu := Ω(pu, fu), and
similarly for Φu, Ψu, Gu and ϕu. We claim that there is some n ≤ Ωu satisfying ¬θ(pn,Φu). Then by
induction over (15), we see that ¬θ(u,Φu), and the theorem follows from the definition of θ . It remains
to prove the claim.
First observe that because Gu is a realizer of MonSeq[X ] for ϕu we have (cf. 10)
∀i < j ≤ ϕu(Gu)(Gui < Gu j∧ p¯Gui ≤X p¯Gu j). (22)
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ε˜ : LEP EPS : DC
Lem. 8
EPS(ε˜) : MB[X∗]
Thm. 10
MonSeq[X ]∧MB[X∗]→WQO[X∗]
λG . λu . ΦG(EPSΩ〈〉(ε˜)(〈Φ,Ψ〉) : MonSeq[X ]→WQO[X∗]
Figure 2: Structure of constructive proof.
Now, G0 ≤G(ϕG) so we have G0 < G(ϕG)+1 = Ωu, therefore by (16) it follows that
Ψu⊳G0 pG0 →¬θ(Ψu, fG0(Ψu)). (23)
The premise of (23) must hold by construction of Ψu, since [pG0−1](G0)= [pG0](n) by (14) and p¯G0⊳pG0G0
(unless pG0G0 = 〈〉 in which case we trivially have ¬θ(pG0,G0+ 1) and hence ¬θ(pG0,Φu)). Therefore
we have ¬θ(Ψu,ϕG) since fGu0(Ψu) = ϕuGu by definition, i.e. the finite sequence
[Ψu](ϕG+1)≡ pG0−10 ,pG0−11 , . . . ,pG0−1G0−1, p˜G0, . . . , p˜G(ϕG−G0)
has one element contained in a later one (we illustrate the case ϕG≥G0 - if ϕG < G0 then [pG0−1](G0)
is bad and hence ¬θ(pG0−1,Φu)). Now since ϕG−G0≤ ϕG, by (22) we see that the sequence
pG0−10 ,p
G0−1
1 , . . . ,p
G0−1
G0−1,p
G0
G0,pG0+1G0+1, . . . ,p
G(ϕG−G0)
G(ϕG−G0),p
G(ϕG−G0)+1
G(ϕG−G0)+1 (∗)
has one element contained in a later one (we need to add an extra element for the same reason as we do in
the proof of Theorem 7). But because G(ϕG−G0)+1≤G(ϕG)+1 = Ωu, by the nesting property (14)
the sequence (∗) is just an initial segment of pG(ϕG−G0)+1, and hence ¬θ(pG(ϕG−G0)+1,G(ϕG−G0)+1)
which implies ¬θ(pG(ϕG−G0)+1,Φu). This proves the claim, completing the proof.
An rough map of our constructive proof, with partial realizers shown is given as Fig. 2.
4.3 An Informal Discussion on the Extracted Program Γ
We conclude the section with an informal analysis of our extracted realizer. Often, programs extracted
from classical proofs via proof interpretations can be very difficult to understand, sometimes taking up
several pages of abstruse higher type syntax or computer code to even state. In contrast, given the logical
complexity of Nash-Williams’ proof our realizer extracted using the Dialectica interpretation is relatively
concise, and we can even describe its operational behaviour to an extent.
We stress that everything which follows is heuristic and has not been properly formalised. Our aim
is merely to illustrate that it is at least feasible to decipher our realizer on a qualitative level!
Our algorithm uses the product of selection functions EPS to interpret the minimal bad sequence
argument used in Nash-Williams’ proof. As observed in Sect. 1.2, EPS - and consequently our extracted
program - comes equipped with a natural game theoretic semantics. For a full account of this the reader
is advised to consult [8, 16]. However, for completeness we state, without further details, the game
theoretic reading of the key constructions in our algorithm.
• The functionals Φ,Ψ assign to any sequence (i.e. infinite play) p, f an outcome of type N× (X∗)ω .
• The selection functions ε˜u - built from the realizer of LEP - implement a strategy for constructing
an optimal play pu, fu, the selection function ε˜un,pn−1 being responsible for constructing the nth point
pnu, fnu in the sequence given that we have already computed the previous value pn−1u .
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• The selection functions make a decision based on the functionals Jn,Qn defined in (20) which (in
loose game theoretic terms) describe the optimal outcome of each potential choice at point n.
• The functional Ω acts as a control, determining the ‘relevant part’ of an infinite play p, f thereby
telling EPS when it has computed a sufficiently long sequence.
In terms of Nash-Williams proof, the sequence pu, fu strategically constructed by EPS constitutes an
‘attempt’ at producing a minimal bad sequence from u (given by p, with accompanying functionals fn
witnessing minimality at point n). We define Φ, Ψ and Ω so that the construction can be essentially
reversed to obtain a bound for u.
So what can we say about this optimal sequence pu, fu? We prove in Theorem 10 that there is some
element of the approximation pnu such that ¬θ(pnu,Φu) holds. It is not too difficult to see, by (21), that
¬θ(pnu,Φu) can only hold if εn,pn−1u picks the default value p
n
u = pn−1u . Similarly we have pn−1u = pn−2u
and so on, so EPS just returns the initial value u at each step.
So how does the program justify selecting u at point n, given that it has already chosen u at n− 1?
We see that the selection function εn,u always sets 〈pnu, fnu〉 = 〈u, f|un |〉 (where the fi are defined as in
(12)), unless the outcome Qn(u, f|un |) = Ψu is lexicographically less than u at point n, in which case it
must check that θ(Ψu, f|un|(Ψu)) is false. But f|un|(Ψu) = Jn(Ψu, f|un|−1) by (12) which checks the final
outcome of EPS given the sequence
(u, f0u), . . . ,(u, fn−1n ),(Ψu, f|un|−1) (∗)
Now in the computation of EPS the functionals Ω, Φ, Ψ only ever look at the first i values of pi−1.
Therefore we propose that because [Ψu](n) = [u](n) (and |un|−1 = |(Ψu)n|) we can identify (∗) with the
outcome of EPS given the sequence
(Ψu, f0Ψu), . . . ,(Ψu, f
n−1
Ψu ),(Ψu, f|(Ψu)n|) (24)
which by our previous argument can be viewed as the outcome of running our algorithm with initial
value Ψu instead of u. In other words we make the identification Jn(Ψu, f|un|−1)∼ ΦΨu = Γ(Ψu), which
explains why we must have ¬θ(Ψu,Jn(Ψu, f|un|−1)).
We claim that the algorithm Γ obtained via EPS has characteristics of an open recursion procedure
(see e.g. [2]), computing Γ(u) by internally computing values of Γ(v) for v lexicographically less than
u. If we take pu to be the constant sequence with value u, then our bound for u is given by Γ(u) :=
Φ(pu, fu) = G(ϕG)+ 1 where now G is a witness for MonSeq[X ] on u¯ and counterexample function
λg . fg0([u](g0)∗(u˜gi)). But by our previous argument we can identify fg0([u](g0)∗(u˜gi))with Γ([u](g0)∗
(u˜gi)). Thus it seems that Γ is closely related to a functional ˜Γ defined, via open recursion, by ˜Γ(u) :=
G(ϕG)+1 where G is a witness for MonSeq[X ] on the counterexample function
ϕ := λg . ˜Γ([u](g0)∗ (u˜gi)).
Of course, none of this precise - the identifications above are made very informally - and in particular
we anticipate that the way our algorithm treats empty words would be more complex than a straightfor-
ward open recursion procedure. However, our purpose here is merely to provide via a casual argument
some insight into how Γ works.
It would be interesting to analyse the behaviour of our extracted algorithm in depth, to give a precise
explanation of the way in which it computes bounds on bad sequences and compare this algorithm to
those extracted using other methods. We leave this as an open problem.
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5 Final Comments
We have used Go¨del’s functional interpretation to produce a constructive version of Nash-Williams’
minimal bad sequence proof of Higman’s lemma. Our proof is relatively short and concise, and the
combinatorial idea behind Nash-William’s proof can be clearly seen in ours. Moreover, we can start to
make sense of the operational behaviour of the extracted algorithm, at least on an informal level. We
hope that this case study provides some insight into program extraction in infinitary combinatorics using
the functional interpretation.
An obvious direction of future work is to better understand our realizer and give a more satisfactory
description than that given in the previous section! One could potentially refine our realizer so that it is
more intuitive and efficient, or alternatively construct a new realizer that directly interprets the functional
interpretation of the minimal bad sequence argument and compare how it behaves to the one given here.
It would also be instructive to formalise our program extraction in a theorem prover, and actually run the
algorithm Γ on some concrete WQOs to analyse its behaviour.
We close with the remark that the ideas in this article could be extended to solve the functional in-
terpretation of the general minimal bad sequence construction, and thereby extract programs from more
complex proofs that use this construction, such as Kruskal’s theorem. While our focus in this article
was on the qualitative aspects of program extraction, it is natural to ask whether one could obtain useful
quantitative information from the analysis of proofs in this area of combinatorics. Bounds for Higman’s
lemma on a finite alphabet have already been produced using more direct methods e.g. [4], but it would
be interesting to see if any useful constructive information could be extracted in the general case or for
related theorems, through the formal analysis of proofs.
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